重大基础工程引发的利益冲突与治理机制研究  

Interest Conflicts and Governance Mechanism Caused by Major Infrastructure Project

作　　者：孙蕾[1] 孙绍荣[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海理工大学管理学院,上海200093

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2016年第1期34-42,共9页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70871080;71171134);上海市教委科研创新重点资助项目(11ZS138);上海市哲学社会科学规划课题(2011BGL006);上海市一流学科建设资助项目(S1201YLXK)

摘　　要：本文主要研究了在国家重大基础工程中,农户,项目法人,地方政府三个利益主体之间的经济利益博弈以及对产生的利益冲突的治理。首先在对三个经济利益主体行为分析的基础上,分别建立了农户与地方政府,项目法人与地方政府的博弈模型。然后通过分析项目法人和地方政府的最优报价,研究了影响各主体收益的可控因素以及造成冲突的原因。最后得出了控制地方政府的行政费用会使项目法人与其达成的交易价格降低,从而使项目法人的剩余分割比例会增加,同时得出增大地方政府在重大基础工程的移民安置与土地补偿工程中的另选址或停工的成本,可以使得农户与其谈判的价格增高,以至农户在全部剩余中所得利益增加,从而维护了农户在剩余分割中的利益。据此本文提出了相应的治理冲突与抵制的措施和制度的建议,为保障重大基础工程的各方的利益与进度提供可靠参考与理论依据。The purpose of this study is to manage conflict arising from the irrational distribution of economic benefit in major infrastructure projects. First, we established two models of local government for farmers and project owners to receive the best quotations. The author analyzed various factors which affect two best quotations. At last, the article put forward some related measures to boycott and manage conflict of interest by a numerical case study. It was discovered that if the local government makes a high compensation for farmers or they have a high administrative cost the project owner will receive a corresponding increase in the optimal offer. If the project owner has to bear a great cost for failed negotiations with the local government, its quotation will be increased. In addition, when the local government chooses to stop project its quotation to farmers will increase. At the same time, local government will offer a high quotation to famers if it receives a high negotiation price with project owner. The results first show that when increasing the cost of local government for famers resettlement and compensation in major infrastructure projects negotiation price with farmers becomes a high level. Consequently, farmers＇ proportion will be increased, thereby safeguarding farmers＇ economic interests of the remaining partition. Second, if local government＇s administrative cost is properly controlled, the project owner will have a low negotiating price with local governments. When project owners＇ proportion is increased, project owner＇s interests in the remaining partition will be maintained. In conclusion, the measure of minimizing local government remaining partition is an effective way to coordinate the interests of all parties in major infrastructure projects. This study offers some solutions to mitigate conflict. This concept of managing the conflict of interests is useful not only for major infrastructure projects but also for other complex, large-scale projects.

关 键 词：冲突治理 利益博弈 基础工程 移民与征地补偿 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]