上市公司重整中行政权运行的偏离与矫正——以45家破产重组之上市公司为研究样本  

The Deviation and Correction of the Operation of Administrative Power during Listed Company's Reorganization——Research on 45 Listed Companies

作　　者：丁燕[1] 

机构地区：[1]青岛大学法学院,山东青岛266071

出　　处：《法学论坛》2016年第2期122-129,共8页Legal Forum

基　　金：2014年山东省高校人文社会科学研究计划项目<上市公司重整中行政权运行的偏离与矫正>(J14WB12)的研究成果

摘　　要：中美两国公司破产重整实践与政府管制经济学理论证明了行政权参与上市公司重整的正当性,但任何权力的行使都应有其边界。我国45家上市公司破产重整实证研究表明,行政权运行已经偏离了正轨,鉴此,有必要采取矫正措施。矫正措施具体包括:实施市场化的管理人选任机制,建立管理人报酬基金和执业责任保险制度;构造多元化的重整计划制定主体,公平分配重整价值;设置专门的破产审判庭,法院实施强制批准时应遵循最大利益原则、最低限度接受原则和绝对优先原则。Chinese and American company＇s reorganization practice,the government regulation economic theory have justified the intervention of the administrative power during Listed Company＇s Reorganization,but the operation of any power should be the boundary. Empirical research on 45 Listed Companies in China has demonstrated that the operation of administrative power has already deviated from the legislation intent,therefore it＇s necessary to take effective measures to solve the problem. For example,we should employ the market mechanism of appointment of trustees and make the system of reward fund and professional liability insurance; we should permit all kinds of interested people to participate in filing the reorganization plan and fairly distribute the reorganization value; we should establish the bankruptcy court and the court must abide by best interest principle,at least one impaired class accepts the plan and absolute priority principle when applying cramedown.

关 键 词：上市公司 破产重整 行政权 偏离 矫正 

分 类 号：DF591.6[政治法律—民商法学]