市场化进程中乡镇政府“行为悖论”的发生学解析  

Genetic Analysis of the Behavior Paradox of the Village and Township Governments in the Process of Marketization

作　　者：徐晨[1] 王振亚[1] 

机构地区：[1]陕西师范大学政治经济学院,陕西西安710062

出　　处：《西北大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2016年第2期138-145,共8页Journal of Northwest University：Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(13XDJ021)

摘　　要：乡镇政府的"行为悖论"即行为失范问题,始终是一个困扰农村改革的难题。从发生学的角度考察,乡镇政府"行为悖论"的产生,有其深刻的社会历史背景和体制根源:以市场化为取向的改革,强化了利益机制在农村社会运行管理中的作用,使乡镇政府面临公共性蜕变和以权力置换利益的巨大风险;"乡政村治"制度安排和乡级财政的结构性缺陷,弱化了乡镇政府的社会管控职能和资源汲取能力,使其在摆脱财政困局的博弈中极易发生突破制度底线的机会主义行为;"压力型体制"下自由裁量行动空间的拓展,加剧了乡镇政府的角色嬗变和行为异化,使其从国家政权代理者蜕变为"政权经营者"的风险增大。The behavior paradox of the village and township governments is also a behavior anomie problem,and it has always been a difficult problem puzzling the countryside. From the perspective of phylogenetics,the behavior paradox has its social background and system root. The market- oriented reform has strengthened the mechanism of interests in the role of rural social management and makes the village and township governments face public metamorphosis and a huge risk to the interests of the replacement power. Rural politics system arrangement and the structural defects of township finance weaken the social control function and resources of the absorbing ability of the village and township governments and enable it to cross the line in the game in getting rid of the financial crisis. Under the pressure type system,the expansion of discretionary action space contributes to the evolution and the role of township government behavior alienation and its agents from the state regime to increased risk of operators regime.

关 键 词：市场化进程 乡镇政府 行为 发生学 

分 类 号：D67[政治法律—政治学]