城市社区卫生服务机构基本药物制度利益相关者博弈分析  

Game Analysis on essential medicine system stakeholders of urban community health service institutions

作　　者：任建萍[1] 颜丹丹[1] 卫萍[1] 郭清[1] 

机构地区：[1]杭州师范大学医学院,浙江杭州310036

出　　处：《卫生软科学》2016年第3期135-137,共3页Soft Science of Health

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71103055);杭州师范大学优秀中青年教师支持计划资助(HNUEYT)

摘　　要：[目的]对关系到城市社区卫生服务机构基本药物制度的利益相关者进行博弈行为研究,探讨达成利益均衡的方法与途径,以促进可持续发展。[方法]运用文献复习法和模型分析法。[结果]地方政府每年的平均卫生投入较之中央政府略高;通过委托-代理模型可知,政府的投入和补偿力度是提高城市社区卫生服务机构实施基本药物制度积极性的关键。[结论]为达成社区基本药物制度的利益均衡,一方面是强化政府的主导作用;另一方面是筑牢社区卫生服务机构的"托底"作用。Objective This paper studies the game behavior of essential medicine system stakeholders of urban community health service institutions in cities. Discusses the way to achieve the benefit equilibrium,in order to promote the sustainable development. Methods This paper uses the method of literature review and model analysis. Results Central government＇ s annual average health investment is lower compared to local government＇ s. Through entrust-agent model,we may know that it is the key of government＇ s investment and compensation dynamics which promote the positivity of essential medicine system in community health service institutions. Conclusions It should strengthen the government＇ s leading role and build well the＂Bottoming＂role of community health service institutions in order to achieve the benefit equilibrium of essential medicine system in community health service institutions.

关 键 词：城市社区卫生服务机构 基本药物制度 利益相关者 博弈分析 

分 类 号：R197[医药卫生—卫生事业管理]