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机构地区:[1]南京师范大学心理学院,南京210097 [2]南京师范大学道德教育研究所,南京210097
出 处:《心理科学》2016年第2期448-453,共6页Journal of Psychological Science
基 金:南京师范大学百名青年领军人才培养计划项目;江苏省社科基金项目(14SHB004);江苏省高校哲学社会科学研究基金项目(2015SJB121)的资助
摘 要:本研究采用连续式公共物品困境,考察不同类型的个体在同伴遵守和违反均等规范两种条件下合作的前后变化及其可能的机制。结果发现:(1)依据行为决策对被试进行的分类与其社会价值取向之间不存在相关;(2)一人违反均等条件下被试的合作水平高于多人违反均等条件下的合作水平;(3)高贡献者在前后两次互动中维持较高的合作水平和信念水平;(4)低贡献者第二次决策时比第一次决策时更合作,这可能是由于他们的合作信念提高。Cooperation in social dilemmas has received considerable attention during the last decades. In the repeated social dilemmas settings, individuals' contributions decline over time and finally reach a minimum when the interaction terminates. However, it is observed that individuals try to increase their contributions in their initial stage of interactions. A previous study using a step-level public good dilemma verified that those who contributed a lot in their first interaction demonstrated high levels of contribution in their subsequent interactions, whereas those who did not contribute much increased their levels of contribution subsequently. In addition, the cooperative level of low contributors increased along with their cooperative belief. In the current study, we aimed to replicate those findings using a different task, i.e., a continuous public good dilemma, and to examine the role of cooperative belief in cooperation. The design was a 2 (peer behavior: equality violation vs. equality compliance) x 2 (decision stage: first vs. second) mixed factor design, with the latter being a within-subjects variable. 60 college students (Mag,=21.13, 27 males) were recruited from a university campus. They were randomly assigned to the equality compliance or violation condition. For each session, a group of six participants were first instructed to make their allocations in a continuous public good game, and then assessed their cooperative believes. Thereafter, manipulation on peer behavior was introduced. In the equality compliance condition, participants believed that most members complied with an equal allocation rule, whereas in the equality violation condition, only one of five other members gave a cooperative allocation and the rest contributed far less than an equal level. Thereafter, the participants were provided another chance to make their allocation decisions and to rate their cooperative belief. In addition, they also assessed their social value orientation. Based on their first decisions
关 键 词:合作社会困境 合作信念 同伴行为社会价值取向
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