利率市场化、存款保险制度与银行挤兑  

Market-oriented Interest Rate,Deposit Insurance System and Bank Runs

作　　者：田国强[1,2] 赵禹朴[1] 宫汝凯[3] 

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学经济学院,200433 [2]美国德州A&M大学经济系 [3]东华大学旭日工商管理学院,200051

出　　处：《经济研究》2016年第3期96-109,共14页Economic Research Journal

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(批准号:NSFC-71371117和NSFC-71271129);国家自然科学基金青年项目(批准号:NSFC-71503037);教育部(上海财经大学)数理经济重点实验室的资助

摘　　要：在推进利率市场化的过程中,避免银行挤兑和实现金融体系的平稳运行是中国在转型过程中面临的重要理论和现实问题。本文基于多轮次噪音信息传递市场环境,构建了一个银行挤兑动态模型,通过综合考虑存款者对银行持有资产收益率的预期、信息加工和传播效率以及不同类型的提前取款动机等方面,探讨银行挤兑的动态过程,给出了各轮次银行挤兑的比例和数量,并刻画出相应的动态均衡;进一步通过引入存款保险制度对基准模型进行扩展,探讨实施存款保险制度与银行挤兑之间关系的作用机理。结果表明,实施存款保险制度通过影响存款者的两类提前取款动机,具有稳定预期和道德风险两个方向相反的效应;存款保险制度的实施效果取决于两种效应的力度对比,而两者之间的比较内生于制度环境。得到的政策启示如下:在实施存款保险制度时,需要建立和健全相应的制度建设配套措施,强化市场约束和完善银行内部治理机制的监督作用来减弱潜在的道德风险问题;继续深化金融体制改革,提高信息的加工和传播效率,促使存款者形成稳定的取款预期,从而增强稳定效应。Avoiding hank runs and achieving a smooth transition of financial system in the process of promoting market- oriented interest rate are important theoretical and practical issues faced by transitional China. Based on the market environment considering multiple rounds noise information, this paper sets up a more generalized dynamic bank-runs model. By considering the depositors＇ expectation of return on assets the bank holds, efficiency of information processing and communication as well as different types of early withdrawal motivation, this paper investigates the dynamic process of bank runs, deduces bank-runs proportion and numbers in each round, and characterizes the dynamic equilibrium. Furthermore, we extend the basic model by introducing deposit insurance system （DIS） to investigate the relationship between the implementation of DIS and bank-runs. We show that DIS implementation would lead to two opposite effects, namely, formation of stable expectations and moral hazard through affecting depositors＇ two types of early withdrawal motivation. Implementation effect of DIS depends on comparison of these two effects, which in turn depends on the institutional environments. This paper also provides the following policy implications： when implementing DIS, it is necessary to establish and improve the corresponding institutions, strengthen market discipline and improve the bank＇s internal governance mechanisms to reduce the potential moral hazard; moreover, it is also important to further deepen financial reform, improve the efficiency of information processing and dissemination, and prompt depositors to form stable withdrawal expectations to enhance the stabilization effect of DIS.

关 键 词：利率市场化 存款保险制度 银行挤兑 道德风险 

分 类 号：F832.5[经济管理—金融学] F832.1