腐败、贿赂与企业垂直整合  

Bribery,Corruption and Firm Vertical Integration

作　　者：李后建[1] 刘艳[2] 臧敦刚[2] 

机构地区：[1]四川农业大学管理学院 [2]四川农业大学经济学院

出　　处：《中国经济问题》2016年第2期40-52,共13页China Economic Studies

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学基金青年项目(12YJC790008);四川省社会科学规划重大项目(SC14ZD09)的资助

摘　　要：本文基于2012年世界银行关于中国企业运营的制度环境质量调查数据,旨在从实证角度研究贿赂等腐败活动与企业垂直整合之间的内在关系。研究发现,贿赂等腐败活动会弱化企业垂直整合动机;此外,本研究结论显示随着国有控股比例的增加和制度质量的改善,贿赂等腐败活动对企业垂直整合的影响也会随之弱化。进一步地,本文还揭示了腐败影响企业垂直整合动机的两条渠道传导机制:即政府订单和银行贷款。上述结论意味着在转型经济体中,贿赂等腐败活动是专业化"小微"企业应对当前市场机制不完善的一种次优策略,但随着市场化制度的逐步完善、法治最高权威的逐步确立,专业化"小微"企业会逐渐放弃这种次优策略,进而选择由完善的市场机制所确立的生存法则。This paper provides a firm-level empirical analysis on the ways in which bribery, corruption affects firm vertical integration using survey data of World Bank about institutional quality of Chinese enterprise operation. This study finds that, bribery, corruption has significantly negative effects on firm vertical integration. Furthermore, this study also reveals two chan- nels about the influence of corruption on firm vertical integration ： government contract and bank lending, that means small and micro specialized businesses take bribery and other corrupt activities as a suboptimal strategy of self-protection to copy with imperfect market mechanism, and partly reveal that the living rules of small and micro specialized businesses under current environment. In addition, the results show that as institutional quality improving, the effects of bribery and other corrupt activities on firm behaviors will be weaken.

关 键 词：贿赂 企业垂直整合 政府订单 银行贷款 

分 类 号：D262.6[政治法律—政治学] F276.3[政治法律—中共党史]