对集体意图原初性的两层辩护  

Two Approaches to the Justification of the Primitiveness of Collective Intention

作　　者：张巍[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学马克思主义学院,天津300072

出　　处：《天津大学学报（社会科学版）》2016年第2期184-188,共5页Journal of Tianjin University：Social Sciences

基　　金：天津市哲学社会科学规划课题资助项目(TJZX13-003)

摘　　要：为集体意图的原初性提供正面辩护,一直都是行动哲学中关于集体行动的研究重心之一。文章试图打破原有的论证框架,从认识论与本体论两个层面分别对该论题进行辩护。其中,认识论层面的辩护主要以协同博弈中的"团队推理"模型为理论基础;而本体论层面的辩护则主要以心理学中的"共有意向性假说"为理论基础。上述论证将指出原初性是集体意图的本质属性,而这一论断也是在自然主义视角下理解集体行动的基础所在。The justification of primitiveness of collective intention is one of the main issues of collective action in philosophy of action. Based on the research of game theory and psychology,especially the＂Team Reasoning＂model and the＂Shared Intentionality Hypothesis＂theory,this paper tries to break out of the normal framework of the justification,and provides a justification in epistemology and ontology respectively. The new justification points out that the primitiveness is one of essential properties of collective intention,and that is also the foundation to understand the nature of collective action in a naturalistic perspective.

关 键 词：集体意图 原初性 自然主义 行动哲学 

分 类 号：B085[哲学宗教—哲学理论]