独立董事治理与声誉回报——基于累积投票选举的分析  被引量:3

Independent Directors Corporate Governance and Reputation Reward——Evidence from Cumulative Voting of Independent Directors

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作  者:韩晴[1] 

机构地区:[1]暨南大学管理学院,广东广州510632

出  处:《暨南学报(哲学社会科学版)》2016年第3期95-104,131-132,共10页Jinan Journal(Philosophy and Social Sciences)

基  金:国家社会科学基金青年项目<机会不平等下的家族企业成长与治理优化研究>(批准号:12CGL034);国家自然科学基金面上项目<企业薪酬契约的作用机理与经济后果研究:基于公平性偏好视角的分析>(批准号:71372167)

摘  要:增加独立董事的中小股东代表性,有利于平衡不同股东的利益、降低资金被占用的风险。经过实证检验,累积投票制在该方面具有显著的治理效果。通过对深、沪市A股上市公司2007—2012年的样本数据进行分析,累积投票制度促使一部分不清楚如何运用投票权或者原本"搭便车"的中小股东对投票权进行委托,把代表中小股东利益的独立董事送进董事会。由于当选独立董事具有明显的标签效应,不容易受大股东控制,因此对关联交易中的资金侵占行为具有显著的监督效果。在此前提下,独立董事也获得相应的声誉回报:潜在雇主通过选举过程对当选独立董事具有更清楚的认识,并转化为独立董事兼职数量和薪酬的提高,体现出声誉造成的回报差异。从长远看,应用累积投票制有利于外部声誉约束的引入,有利于独立董事的轮替形成良性循环。Independent Directors' responsiveness to shareholders helps to alleviate conflicts among different groups of shareholders,and cumulative voting contributes to practice of this function. When cumulative voting plays a role in the system of corporate governance,minor shareholders who were not aware of power of voting or would like to take a free ride are possible to trade their voting rights.Independent directors supported by minor shareholders are reluctant to take compromise offered by major shareholders,which refines supervisions over tunneling or other fund transferring initiated by major shareholders. Meanwhile, during this process,potential employers have a better understanding of independent directors' duties from highly competitive cumulative voting and intense media coverage on news of subsequent proxy fight,which will be converted into increases in the number of directorship of other companies and in the amount of salary. Therefore,Independent directors' reputations are recognized and rewarded,and their behaviors are disciplined in a concreted way. In a long run,cumulative voting should be considered as stimulus to the reputation-reward system,leading to a virtuous turnover cycle which stays attractive to competent independent directors.

关 键 词:独立董事 累积投票制 大股东侵占 声誉约束 

分 类 号:F230[经济管理—会计学]

 

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