市场价格信息不对称的银企融资决策  

Financing decisions between bank and retailer under asymmetric sale price information

作　　者：刘克宁[1,2] 宋华明[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京理工大学经济管理学院,南京210094 [2]鲁东大学交通学院,山东烟台264025

出　　处：《控制与决策》2016年第4期647-655,共9页Control and Decision

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71172105;71472089;71571102)

摘　　要：研究市场价格信息不对称下,受资金约束的零售商为获取最优订货量从资本市场借贷的供应链运营和融资决策问题.采用Stackelberg博弈,构建并分析混同契约和甄别契约模型.研究表明:甄别契约能更好地激励零售商透露真实信息,使供应链整体利润增加;银行更偏好高价格零售商以降低借贷风险,银行在甄别契约下的期望利润总是大于混同契约下的期望利润;高价格零售商的期望利润受到价格波动和其类型比例的双重影响,在一定条件下选择甄别契约会得到额外的信息租金.Based on the asymmetric sale price information, the interactions of operational and financing decision problems are studied in the supply chain, where a capital-constraint retailer borrows from the capital market to get the optimal ordering.With the Stackelberg game, the pooling contract and the screening contract are modeled under asymmetric information. The conclusions indicate that the screening contract is more helpful to motivate retailers to tell the private information and also to increase the profit of the whole supply chain than the pooling contract. The commercial bank prefers the retailer with higher price to reduce the credit risks. The screening model brings more profit to the bank than the pooling contract. The profit of the higher price retailer is influenced by the proportionality factor and the difference between two prices. The retailer with higher price will get information rent as the proportion of lower price retailers exceeds the threshold.

关 键 词：价格信息不对称 STACKELBERG博弈 融资决策 甄别契约 混同契约 

分 类 号：C931[经济管理—管理学] F253