LR-型模糊需求下供应链的质量控制与成本分担  

Quality control and cost sharing of the supply chain under LR-type fuzzy demand

作　　者：林晶[1,2] 王健[1] 

机构地区：[1]福州大学经济与管理学院,福州350116 [2]福建江夏学院数理教研部,福州350108

出　　处：《控制与决策》2016年第4期678-684,共7页Control and Decision

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(12BJY069);福建省教育厅项目(JB13281)

摘　　要：研究LR-型模糊需求下两级供应链中可变比例成本分担和质量控制的契约设计问题.在召回成本无分担的分散模式下,供应链成员努力投资不足,集中式供应链努力选择互补,互补程度关于单位召回成本和总缺陷率递增.引入可变比例成本分担契约,该契约能发挥制造商与供应商的努力选择互补效应,且双方关于努力选择的博弈存在Nash均衡.当缺陷分析成本为零时,在契约Φ下供应链成员激励相容,供应链的整体利润等于集中式最优利润.确定可变分担比例解析解、缺陷率阈值.验证结果表明,契约Φ的成本无效指数和质量无效指数均低于固定比例成本分担合同,契约Φ比固定比例成本分担合同更合理、有效.Under the LR-type fuzzy demand, the cost sharing contract with variable ratio and quality control in the two-stage supply chain are researched. In the condition of disaggregation mode without sharing recall cost, the supply chain members make their effort to insufficient investment, however, they try to make complementation in the central supply chain, and the degree of complementation is increasing with the growing of unit recall cost and total defect rate. Through importing cost sharing contract with the variable ratio, it is found that this contract can exert the manufacturers and suppliers to make their effort to choose the complementary effect, and it exists Nash equilibrium in making effort to choose the game between the two sides. When the defect analysis cost is zero, supply chain members are of incentive compatibility under the contract Φ,and the total profit of supply chain equals to the optimal profit in the central mode. The variable allocation proportion analytic solution and the defect rate threshold value are ensured. Verification results show that the invalid cost index and the invalid quality index of the contract Φ are both lower than the cost-sharing contract with the fixed ratio, and the contract Φ is more reasonable and more effective.

关 键 词：LR-型模糊需求 可变比例成本分担 质量激励机制 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]