对赌协议机制下企业再融资阶段三方博弈  

Trilateral Game during Enterprises' Refinancing period under Valuation Adjustment Mechanism

作　　者：刘峰涛[1] 赵袁军[1] 刘玮[1] 

机构地区：[1]东华大学旭日工商管理学院,上海200051

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2016年第2期246-252,共7页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(CUSFDH-D-2015065);国家留学基金委资助项目(201506630047)

摘　　要：对赌协议机制下,企业的再融资面临复杂的博弈问题。基于此,利用博弈论分析工具,全面解析在不同的合谋情况下,融资企业、首轮投资方与再融资投资方(第三方)的决策行为,探讨对赌目标的严格程度与企业的努力水平对企业预期收益的影响,旨在明确企业的对赌策略。最后,运用Matlab软件进行算例分析来验证结论。Under the Valuation Adjustment Mechanism（VAM）,enterprises face complicated games during the refinancing period.We use Game Theory to analyze the decisions of enterprises,the first round investors and the later round investors under different collusion conditions.We also study the influence of stringency of the target and the efforts level of the enterprises on enterprises earnings in order to study the enterprise strategy.Finally,we use Matlab to test the resluts.

关 键 词：对赌协议 博弈论 再融资 

分 类 号：F830.59[经济管理—金融学]