政治关联程度与授信额度获取  

The Extent of Political Connections and Access to Credit Lines

作　　者：应千伟[1] 罗党论[2] 

机构地区：[1]四川大学商学院 [2]中山大学岭南学院

出　　处：《金融学季刊》2015年第2期126-148,共23页Quarterly Journal of Finance

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71373167,71003108,70902024);广东省哲学社会科学“十二五”规划项目(GD14CYJ03);广东省自然科学基金资助项目(2014A030313118);四川大学中央高校基本科研业务费研究专项项目(skqy201312,2013SCU04A32);四川大学引进人才科研启动经费;中山大学青年教师培育项目的资助

摘　　要：对于中国大部分企业来说，银行授信额度是一种稀缺的金融资源。通过构建2004-2009年中国A股上市公司的政治关联程度指标，本文研究发现，当企业需要授信额度时，政治关联程度越高，越容易获得银行授信额度，尤其是更容易从国有银行获得授信额度。进一步还发现，对于融资约束较大的企业、民营企业以及处于政府干预程度较高地区的企业，政治关联对企业获得银行授信额度的帮助更明显。结果表明，我国银行的信贷决策，尤其是国有银行的信贷决策在很大程度上依然受到政府干预和政治关联的影响，而且这种影响不只局限于表内信贷资源的配置，还会进一步扩展到表外潜在的信贷资源配置。Bank lines of credit is a scarce financial resource for most of the firms in China. By constructing the political connections measure of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2004--2009, this paper verifies that the firms＇ political connections can help them obtain credit lines when they are in need of it, and especially more easily from state-owned banks. It is further found in this pa-per that the political connections have a more significant positive effect on the access to lines of credit for those firms faced with financing constraints, private firms or firms in the provinces with higher degree of government intervention. Our results indicate that credit decisions of the banks, especially the state-owned banks, are still largely influenced by government intervention and politi- cal connection. Moreover, this influence is not confined to the allocation of in-balance sheet loan resources, but will be further extended to the allocation of off-balance sheet potential credit re- sources.

关 键 词：政治关联程度 授信额度 融资约束 国有银行 

分 类 号：G21[文化科学—新闻学]