国有股权转让中的股权定价与道德风险问题研究——基于委托代理理论视角  

Research on the Pricing of Equity and Moral Risk in the Transfer of State-owned Stock Rights——Based on the Theory of Principal Agent

作　　者：秦声[1] 

机构地区：[1]中央财经大学,北京100081

出　　处：《铜陵学院学报》2016年第1期44-47,共4页Journal of Tongling University

摘　　要：从产权交易视角,立足于国有股权转让定价方式,认为现阶段我国国有企业存在从所有者到政府,再到企业管理者的多层委托代理关系,当代理关系发生但缺乏必要监管措施的时候,就会发生道德风险问题。因此,必须从制度、政策等方面,加强监督和激励,强化对国有企业经营者在国有股权交易过程中的监督制约,对其中可能发生的道德风险进行防范和控制。we start our research from the perspective of property rights transaction, basing on the method of pricing in the transfer of state owned shares. We think that there exist multiple principal agent relationship from the owner to the government, and then to the business manager. The problem of moral risk occurs when there is lack of supervision and regulatory measures of agency relation. Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen supervision and encouragement from aspects of system and policy, strengthening the control of stateowned enterprise operators and preventing the occurrence of moral risk in the reform of state-owned enterprises in China.

关 键 词：混合所有制 国有企业 股权定价 道德风险 

分 类 号：F832.5[经济管理—金融学]