终极控制权、现金流权与债务期限结构  

Ultimate Controlling Rights,Cash Flow Rights and Debt Maturity Structure

作　　者：常茂松[1] 

机构地区：[1]河南牧业经济学院会计学院,河南郑州450044

出　　处：《金融理论与实践》2016年第4期32-35,共4页Financial Theory and Practice

摘　　要：从终极产权的视角,以我国沪、深两市公司为研究对象,考察了终极股东控制权、现金流权与债务期限结构的关系。发现:终极股东现金流权水平越高,其掠夺外部投资者的成本也就越高,债务融资的代理成本降低,银行等金融机构愿意为公司提供更多较长期限的债务资金,终极控制股东现金流权对公司债务期限结构具有显著正向影响。而终极股东控制权与现金流权分离程度越高,其越有可能掠夺外部投资者,增大了公司与债权人的代理冲突,导致较高的债务融资代理成本,银行等金融机构倾向于为其提供更多的短期资金来约束终极控制股东。Using a balanced panel data of 915 Chinese listed firms, this paper studies the relationship between ultimate controlling rights and debt maturity structure by adopting random effect model. The results show： the larger the ultimate controlling shareholders＇ cash flow rights, the higher the cost of expropriating outside investors by ultimate controlling shareholder, and can reduce the agency costs of debt financing, so banks are willing to provide more long term debt funds for the firms. Ultimate controlling shareholders＇ cash flow rights are positively related to debt maturity structure. The larger the divergence between ultimate controlling shareholders＇ control rights and cash flow rights, the more likely of ultimate controlling shareholder to expropriate outside investors, and this increase the agency conflicts between firms and creditor, which leading to higher agency costs of debt financing, so banks tend to provide more short term funds for firms to constrain the ultimate controlling shareholder. The divergence between ultimate controlling shareholders＇ controlling rights and cash flow rights is negatively related to debt maturity structure.

关 键 词：终极股东 债务期限结构 现金流权 

分 类 号：F830.9[经济管理—金融学]