大销量竞争、质量水平差距与产品安全规制  

Large Sales Competition,Quality Level Disparity and Product Safety Regulation

作　　者：吴绪亮[1] 孙召金[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学产业组织与企业组织研究中心,辽宁大连116025

出　　处：《产业经济研究》2016年第2期43-50,共8页Industrial Economics Research

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(11YJCZH189);辽宁省教育厅人文社科研究基地项目(ZJ2014041)

摘　　要：现有文献关于产品安全与质量的研究忽略了企业内部激励问题,特别是企业目标函数对产品安全和质量的影响。通过构造一个两阶段博弈模型和质量参差指标,考察了企业热衷于大销量竞争而非仅仅利润水平的情形下,差异化产品市场上生产企业的安全和质量努力及市场中产品安全和质量水平的差距分布。研究发现,大销量竞争确实可以提高企业的产品安全和质量水平,非对称性大销量竞争会扩大企业间的安全和质量水平差距,企业成本差距程度始终与企业的产品安全和质量水平负相关。The effects of firms＇ internal incentive, and objective function in particular, on product safety and quality were neglected by the existing literature. In the paper, a two-stage game theoretical model and a quality disparity ratio were constructed to examine finn＇s safety and quality efforts as well as the distribution of product safety and quality level in a differentiated products market when firms are interested in large sales competition rather than just profit level. The results found that large sales competition really can promote firms＇ product safety and quality level, asymmetric large sales competition will expand firms＇ safety and quality disparity, firms＇ cost disparity is always negatively related to product safety and quality level.

关 键 词：产品差异化 大销量竞争 质量参差指标 安全规制 豪泰林竞争 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学] F407.82