奶牛养殖创新合作的演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary game analysis of innovation cooperation in dairy farming

作　　者：马国顺[1] 徐永安[1] 

机构地区：[1]西北师范大学数学与统计学院,兰州730070

出　　处：《黑龙江畜牧兽医（下半月）》2016年第3期4-6,共3页

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71061012);甘肃省自然科学基金项目(145RJZA102)

摘　　要：为了研究奶牛养殖创新合作的演化博弈分析,笔者通过建立演化博弈分析的复制动态模型,对各利益相关主体的行为及其相互影响进行研究,分析各策略的动态演化过程,利用雅克比矩阵的稳定性判断影响博弈方策略选择的几个参数及参数之间的关系。结果表明:各博弈方策略的选择受博弈双方初始支付矩阵及关键参数选择的影响;政府的投入力度直接影响着均衡解;通过降低创新合作成本、增大创新合作带来的额外收益以及合理的确定合作风险,都可以促进奶牛养殖创新合作的高效执行。To study the evolutionary game analysis of innovation eooperation in dairy farming, the behaviors of all stakeholders and their mutual influences were studied through establishing a replicated dynamic model of evolutionary game analysis. The dynamic evolution processes of all strategies were analyzed, and the stability of Jaeobian matrix was utilized to judge several parameters influencing the strategic choice of game party and the relationship between the parameters. The results showed that the initial payment matrix and selection of key parameters between game parities influenced the strategic＇choice of the game parties. The strength of government＇s commitment directly influenced the equilibrium. The efficient execution of innovation cooperation in dairy farming could be promoted through reducing the cost of innovation cooperation increas- ing the extra income of innovation cooperation and the determination of reasonable cooperation risk.

关 键 词：奶牛养殖 创新合作 演化博弈 奶业 养殖效益 

分 类 号：S823.91[农业科学—畜牧学] S815.5[农业科学—畜牧兽医]