晚清“官督商办”企业制度的“跷跷板”效应  

On the Fluctuating between Official Supervision and Commercial Operation of Enterprise System in Late Qing Dynasty

作　　者：李玉[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学中华民国史研究中心

出　　处：《南京社会科学》2016年第4期146-153,共8页Nanjing Journal of Social Sciences

基　　金：国家社科基金重点项目"晚清社会欺诈问题研究"(13AZS016)的阶段性成果

摘　　要："官督商办"是晚清官商最初认同的一种企业制度,其设计命意在于整合各方优势,以利企业发展。然而,实际经营过程中,相关企业虽然从官方获得一些特权,但同时又受到"官气"侵袭,经营负担加重;制度设计的"保商"功能逐步被"剥商"效应取代,遂广为社会诟病。"官"与"商"两个主体、"督"与"办"两种行为的组合,使得"官督商办"的"跷跷板"效应在所难免。官员的不良作为株连到政府信用,制度的社会认同被严重削弱。由此说明,只有"治法"与"治人"相得益彰,制度设计所预期的"良法美意"才能得到充分体现。The official supervision and commercial operation was the first enterprise system for government and merchant class accepted commonly,the purpose of this design was to integrate the advantages with all sides,so that the business development could be facilitated. During the operating course,enterprise although got some privileges from government,but also got the heavy burden from the official,and the protection of system to business was gradually replaced by exploitation,as a result,this system was widely criticized by the community. The combine of two subjects,official and merchants,and two managements,official supervision and commercial operation,made the system run like a seesaw inevitably. The government credit was implicated by official＇s bad behaviors,and the social identity of this system was weakened severely,which showed,the good system must be operated by good people,in order to realize the right goal and great function of the designed system.

关 键 词：官督商办 制度困境 政府信誉 

分 类 号：K25[历史地理—历史学]