全流通时代MBO是否具有激励效应--基于“羚锐制药”的案例研究  

Can MBO Encourage Managers in the Entire Circulation Stage?——A Case Study of Lingrui Pharma

作　　者：邓路[1] 刘瑞琪[2] 李建立[2] 

机构地区：[1]北京航空航天大学经济管理学院会计系 [2]北京航空航天大学经济管理学院

出　　处：《金融评论》2015年第5期45-57,123-124,共13页Chinese Review of Financial Studies

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(批准号:71202014,71572007);北京高校青年英才计划项目(批准号:YETP1099)资助

摘　　要：管理层收购作为20世纪90年代末国有企业改革的重要方式之一,受到了学术界和实务界的广泛关注,但以往研究多是基于股权分置的背景。本文以羚锐制药在股权分置改革之后进行的管理层收购为例,从管理层和大股东两个层面,多维度剖析公司在管理层收购后的资本运作状况,进一步结合公司财务绩效和股价市场表现分析其经济后果。研究发现,羚锐制药在管理层收购后,管理层与外部股东之间的代理问题有所减弱,公司价值有所提升。股权分置改革完成后,管理层收购较好地协调了管理层与外部中小股东的利益,对管理层起到激励作用,公司业绩提升,中小股东利益得到有效保护。本文的研究结论为全流通时代管理层收购激励效应提供了证据支持,为新一轮国企改革提供决策依据。Management Buy-outs(MBO) is one of the important ways of state-owned enterprises reform in the late 1990 s and has received much attention of the academics and practitioners. But previous researches are based on the background of split share structure, and this paper takes Lingrui Pharma's MBO as an example to analyze company operation after MBO in the entire circulation stage from the aspects of managers and major shareholders. Further, this paper evaluates the economic consequences from the financial performance and stock market performance. The results show that after MBO, agency problems between managers and outside shareholders have subsided and the value of company has improved. After the completion of reform of non-tradable shares, MBO can coordinate the interests of managers and outside shareholders, encourage managers, improve company's performance and protect minority shareholders' interests. This paper provides evidences for the incentive effects of MBO in the entire circulation stage and provide decision-making basis for the new round of state-owned enterprises reform.

关 键 词：管理层收购 激励效应 经济后果 

分 类 号：F426.72[经济管理—产业经济] F272.92