询价机构意见分歧与IPO定价效率  

Disagreement of Institutional Investors' Bids and IPO Pricing Efficiency

作　　者：徐妍[1] 郑冠群[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学经济与金融学院,陕西西安710061

出　　处：《经济问题》2016年第4期73-78,共6页On Economic Problems

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目"民间资本供应;风险防范及其健康发展研究"(12&ZD071)

摘　　要：实证检验了我国新股发行制度改革第三阶段询价机构意见分歧与IPO定价效率的关系,研究发现:在监管部门针对"超募"、"发行市盈率"、"存量股转让"实施的一系列行政干预下,询价机构意见分歧与IPO定价效率之间的关系弱化,询价机制没有发挥应有的市场化定价效力。研究认为,未来完善我国新股发行制度仍应坚实市场化方向,以提升询价机制的定价效率。This paper empirically tests the relationship between the disagreement of institutional investors＇ bids and IPO pricing efficiency in the third stage of China＇s IPO mechanism reform. The paper finds that under the administrative intervention aimed at over- financing,P / E ratio and secondary offering,the relationship between the disagreement of institutional investors＇ bids and IPO pricing efficiency has been weakened,and the enquiry system has not fulfilled its market- oriented pricing function. The results suggest that IPO mechanism reform in the future should adhere to the market- oriented direction,and improve the efficiency of enquiry machanism.

关 键 词：询价机制 定价效率 新股发行体制改革 行政干预 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]