基于动态博弈的第三方支付规制分析  

Analysis on Dynamic Game of Third Party Payment Regulation

作　　者：谢瑶华[1] 栾福茂[2] 

机构地区：[1]浙江经济职业技术学院,浙江杭州310018 [2]辽宁大学经济学院,辽宁沈阳110036

出　　处：《浙江金融》2016年第2期21-24,共4页Zhejiang Finance

摘　　要：近年来,随着第三方支付的迅速发展及规模的不断壮大,针对第三方支付的规制政策也不断出台。本文采用kane的金融创新与金融规制博弈理论思想,分析规制政策对第三方支付机构的影响,即分别在不同决策收益的情况下,第三方支付机构和规制当局的不同的策略选择。研究表明,如果政策采取简单地加重违规处罚力度,短期内有效。但是长期看,只是将规制机构的规制概率减少。但如果是加大对规制机构失职的惩处,则规制机构必定选择规制,这就迫使第三方支付机构减少违规的概率。In recent years, with the rapid development and growing scale of the third party payment,the regulation pol-icies are also continuing released. This paper adopts the Kane＇s Financial Innovation and Regulation Game Theory to ana-lyze the regulation policy impact on third party payment agencies, namely, in the case of different decision-making inter-ests, the third party payment agencies andregulation authorities will choose different strategies. The research shows that ifthe policy simply increases punishment on violations, it＇s useful in a short time. But in a long time, the regulation authori-ties will reduce the regulatory probabilities. If increasing punishments on the regulatory agencies, the regulation authoritieswill choose regulation which forces the third party payment agencies reducing violation probabilities.

关 键 词：第三方支付机构 规制政策 博弈 

分 类 号：F832[经济管理—金融学]