成本结构离散的两属性电子逆向拍卖机制设计  

Mechanism design of bi-attribute electronic reverse auction with discrete cost structure

作　　者：黄敏[1,2] 钱小虎[1,2] 金东洋[1,2] 王兴伟[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学信息科学与工程学院 [2]流程工业综合自动化国家重点实验室(东北大学),辽宁沈阳110819

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2016年第1期88-100,共13页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家杰出青年科学基金资助项目(71325002;61225012);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71071028;70931001;71021061);高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金优先发展领域资助项目(20120042130003);高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金资助项目(20110042110024);中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(N110204003;N120104001);流程工业综合自动化国家重点实验室基础科研业务费资助项目(2013ZCX11);东北大学基本科研业务费资助项目(N130604004)

摘　　要：在由一个采购商和多个供应商组成的电子逆向拍卖系统中,针对供应商成本结构离散且成本和交货期是其私有信息的两属性机制设计问题,为采购商提出一个新的基于协商的多轮逆向拍卖机制.建立基于协商的两层分布式决策模型,提出基于交货期偏差量的交货期让步策略、基于总体目标值的交货期让步策略和基于总体目标值的带有随机的交货期让步策略,并通过数值算例验证了所提让步策略的可行性和有效性.最后通过随机算例对所提的三种让步策略进行对比分析,结果表明基于总体目标值的带有随机的交货期让步策略具有最佳的协商效果.In an electronic reverse auction system that consists of a single buyer and multiple potential suppliers, based on the bi-attribute mechanism design problem of discrete cost structure where cost and delivery time are suppliers＇ private information, a new iterative reverse auction mechanism based on negotiation theory is proposed for the buyer. A bi-level distributed decision-making model based on negotiation is constructed,and then we propose a concession strategy of delivery time based on deviation of delivery time, a concession strategy of delivery time based on overall target value and a concession strategy of delivery time with randomness based on overall target value. A numerical example is given to show the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed strategies. Finally, the comparison between the three concession strategies is presented by randomly generated numerical examples, and the result shows that the concession strategy of delivery time with randomness based on overall target value is the best in comparison with the other two.

关 键 词：电子逆向拍卖 机制设计 两层分布式决策模型 协商 交货期让步策略 

分 类 号：F713.36[经济管理—产业经济] F224