干中学、预先承诺和最优研发政策  

Learning by Doing,Pre-commitment and Optimal R&D Policies

作　　者：马士群[1] 陈晓和[1] 陈磊[2] 

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学财经所,上海200433 [2]上海海事大学经管学院,上海201306

出　　处：《华东理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2016年第1期81-87,共7页Journal of East China University of Science and Technology：Social Science Edition

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目(11AJY004)"国防经济资源保障绩效研究";上海市教委创新项目(14YS052)"产业结构视角下的收入分配改善机制研究";上海财经大学研究生创新基金(CXJJ-2013-463)"装备保障绩效研究"的资金支持

摘　　要：在一个具有研发学习效应的国际寡头框架下,本文将动态不一致、研发学习效应引入到一个两时期四阶段的离散模型中,考察政府与厂商预先承诺能力的差异对产业战略性研发政策的影响。结果表明:完全预先承诺均衡情形下,研发政策纯粹表现为租金转移的激励;仅政府预先承诺均衡情形下,本国厂商为了获得第二期研发优势,第一期将选择过度研发,由此研发政策将包含一项课税激励;序贯均衡情形下,本国厂商为了获得更多的第二期补贴,第一期研发投资更为过度,由此进一步增强了研发政策中的课税激励。In accordance with three different assumptions about pre-commitment of government and enterprise, this paper examines the implications of optimal R＆D policies in a two-period （four-stage） Cournot oligopoly game with learning by doing in R＆D activities： in FCE, optimal subsidies come only from incentive of rent shifting; in GCE, optimal subsidies have an extra taxation term which offsets the strategic behavior by the home firm; in SE, optimal subsidies further includes another extra taxation term which offsets the strategic behavior by the home firm aimed at manipulating period-2 subsidy. Provided learning by doing in R＆D activities is significant, and results in SE will possibly weaken the infant-industry argument.

关 键 词：学习效应 预先承诺 战略性研发政策 

分 类 号：F410[经济管理—产业经济]