煤炭资源整合主客体三方协调博弈关系分析  

Analysis of coordinated relationship in the game of coal resources integration's subject-object three-side

作　　者：谭梅[1,2] 韩丽丽[1,2] 宋华岭[2] 邱梦莹 

机构地区：[1]山东师范大学管理科学与工程学院,山东济南250358 [2]山东工商学院管理科学与工程学院,山东烟台264005

出　　处：《中国矿业》2016年第4期35-39,共5页China Mining Magazine

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目资助(编号:71373148);山东省自然科学基金项目资助(编号:Y2006H10);教育部人文社会科学研究项目资助(编号:11YJA630101)

摘　　要：基于我国煤炭资源整合过程中的利益博弈问题,本文通过对煤炭资源整合系统中主体(省政府)、主客体(地方政府)和客体三方之间的协调博弈关系进行系统全面地分析,建立了煤炭资源整合的系统演化博弈模型:主体(省政府)与主客体演化博弈模型和主客体与客体演化博弈模型。应用该模型研究了在四种不同情形的主体(省政府)与主客体博弈动态演化过程和六种不同情形的主客体与客体动态演化过程,从而得到煤炭资源整合系统演化收敛于不监察-不监管-配合模式的条件模型;并从主体(省政府)的角度,提出了利益协调的政策建议。Based on the benefit gambling problem in the process of coal resources integration in China, the coordinated relationship in the game between subject （provincial government）,subject ＆object （local government） and object is analyzed systematically. Consequently, systematic evolutionary game models of coal resources integration are established, which include evolutionary game model of subject （ provincial government ）and subject ＆ object, and one of subject＆ object and object. On the basis of the proposed model,dynamic evolution processes of subject （provincial government）and subject ＆ object in four different situations and ones of subject ＆ object and object in six different situations are examined, which reaches a conclusion that the evolutionary system of coal resources integration converges to the conditional model of no supervision-no regulation-cooperation＇ s pattern. Ultimately, from the perspective of subject （provincial government） ,policy suggestions of interest coordination are proposed.

关 键 词：煤炭资源整合 演化博弈 演化稳定性 动态演化过程 

分 类 号：F407.21[经济管理—产业经济]