法律、司法层级制与委托代理理论——读金的《超越委托代理理论:法律和司法层级制》  

Law,Judicial Hierarchy and Principal-Agent Theories——Impression of Pauline T. Kim's “Beyond Principal-Agent Theories”: Law and the Judicial Hierarchy

作　　者：周乾 吴秀尧[2] 

机构地区：[1]安庆师范大学,安徽芜湖246011 [2]中国政法大学,北京100088

出　　处：《山西警官高等专科学校学报》2016年第2期22-25,共4页Journal of Shanxi Pollce Academy

基　　金：2016年度安徽高校人文社会科学研究重点项目"法金融学论角下安徽省金融法律水平提升研究"(SK2016A0567)

摘　　要：大量文献已经研究了如何使用委托代理理论来分析司法层级制,从而在约束条件下实现委托人和代理人利益最大化。但是金认为委托代理理论并不太适合用来分析司法层级制,有关上下级法院之间互动关系的更高效模型是一种混合动机协调博弈,而且法律的作用不应仅仅被视为一种信号或命令,而应是上下级法院的共同产物。虽然她只是提出了一种构想,但是该理论对于跨学科分析司法体系层级制,以及法官、法院和法律的角色提出了更好的思路。Extensive literature has studied how to use the principal-agent theories to analyze the judicial hierarchy,so that to achieve the maximum interests of the principals and agents in the constraint condition. But Kim holds that the principal-agent theories are not quite suitable for analyzing judicial hierarchy,a more efficient model of the interaction among the higher courts and lower courts is a mixed-motives coordination game,and the role of law should not only be seen as a signal or command,but also a joint product of higher courts and lower courts. Although she only raised a preliminary idea,the theories suggest better ideas for interdisciplinary analysis of judicial hierarchy and the role of judges,courts and law in addition.

关 键 词：法律 司法层级制 委托代理理论 

分 类 号：D916.2[政治法律—法学]