非对称需求突变信息情况下的竞争供应链博弈模型研究  

Research on the Game Model of Competitive Supply Chains with Asymmetric Demand and Abrupt Information

作　　者：冯美玲[1] 陈克兵[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京航空航天大学理学院,南京211106

出　　处：《西安文理学院学报（自然科学版）》2016年第2期7-12,共6页Journal of Xi’an University(Natural Science Edition)

摘　　要：通过最优化理论与博弈论的信息机制设计原理,两条竞争供应链的伯特兰德价格竞争博弈模型,研究了竞争供应链有需求扰动发生,且一条链扰动信息共享、另一条链扰动信息不共享的情况下,渠道成员的最优决策问题得到了在不同情况下的均衡解以及鲁棒性的范围,发现供应商的生产计划并不总是随着扰动的发生而改变.In this paper, based on the theory of optimization, the design principle of information mechanism of the game theory, and the Bertland price competition game model of two competitive supply chains, research on that there is a demand disturbance in the competitive supply chain was carried out. Under the condition that the disturbance information was sharing in one chain, and the disturbance information was not shared in another chain, the equilibrium solu- tion and the range of robustness in different situations were got for the problem of the optimal decision of channel members. It is found that the supplier＇s production plan does not always change with the change of the disturbance.

关 键 词：不对称信息 价格决策 竞争供应链 博弈论 扰动管理 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]