公众权益与跨区域生态规制策略研究——相邻地方政府间的演化博弈行为分析  

Public Rights and Cross-regional Ecological Regulation Strategy Research——Adjoining Government Behavior Analysis Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

作　　者：彭皓玥[1] 

机构地区：[1]山西财经大学管理科学与工程学院,山西太原030031

出　　处：《科技进步与对策》2016年第7期42-47,共6页Science & Technology Progress and Policy

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(13YJCZH137);国家留学基金地方合作项目(留金法[2015]5104);国家自然科学基金项目(71173141);山西省高等学校哲学社会科学研究项目(2013326)

摘　　要：以公众权益为视角,运用演化博弈分析方法,分别从未引入约束机制的公众生态权益模糊情形以及引入约束机制的生态权益明确情形,建立跨区域生态规制演化博弈模型,剖析不同情形相邻地方政府间的博弈行为。结果表明,明确公众生态权益,引入强制约束机制后,原有博弈结构被改变,长期内,有利于规避跨区域环境规制的"囚徒困境"。进一步探析博弈参数发现,反馈机制、责惩措施、行为效果感知、行为成本等要素均能改变鞍点位置,推进博弈稳定策略向博弈方严格落实国家生态规制方向演进。研究结论可为政府制定跨区域生态规制策略提供有针对性的政策参考。Based on the public rights perspective,the cross-regional ecological regulation strategy evolutionary game model was established.The ecological regulation strategies of local governments were studied respectively from vague public rights situation and definite public rights situation.The results showed that when force restriction mechanism had been introduced,the public rights became definite,game structure had been changed.In the long term,it was beneficial to avoid prisoner＇s dilemma in environmental regulation.Moreover the article still analyzed the parameters to find the way of the Pareto improvement.It had been showed that these were useful to adjust ecological regulation for the government by improving feedback mechanism and behavior perception,carrying out punishment measures,and reducing the execution cost.

关 键 词：公众权益 跨区域生态规制 演化博弈 地方政府 行为策略 

分 类 号：F124.5[经济管理—世界经济]