PPP模式下的城市轨道交通项目投资策略研究  

Project Investment in the Field of Urban Rail Transit under the PPP Mode

作　　者：黄智星[1] 申金升[1] 王传涛[2] 

机构地区：[1]北京交通大学系统工程与控制研究所,北京100044 [2]北京建筑大学工业工程系,北京100044

出　　处：《交通运输系统工程与信息》2016年第2期14-18,56,共6页Journal of Transportation Systems Engineering and Information Technology

基　　金：国家科技支撑计划项目(2014BAH23F01)~~

摘　　要：PPP模式在国内城市轨道交通领域的应用前景广阔.社会投资机构与政府在城市轨道交通领域的项目合作,本质上是一种投资决策分析,核心在于研究社会投资机构的投资决策规律.本文在PPP模式下,通过分析PPP项目的基本博弈关系,模拟作为理性人的社会投资机构参与政府择优选择项目合作伙伴的特征,基于Bayesian博弈构建模型,提出博弈主体的效用水平和目标函数,并研究在博弈均衡结果下,无投资偏好和有投资偏好条件的报价特点及最佳策略,旨在为应用PPP模式促进城市轨道交通项目建设提供理论参考,最大程度减少因投资评价不准确、不合理而造成项目失败的风险.The PPP（Public Private Partnership） mode will be very popular in the urban rail transit in China.In essence, the project cooperation between social investors and government department in the field of urban rail transit is a kind of investment decision. Its core is studying the investment decisions of the social investing institution. Under the PPP mode, this paper analyzes the basic game relationship in the PPP project,and simulates that investing institutions and government departments select as rational persons outstanding project partners. A Bayesian game model is constructed. It is proposed that the utility level as well as the objective function of the game player. In addition, this paper researches on quotation characteristics and the optimal strategies with investment preference of investing institutions or without investment preference in the game equilibrium. It purposes to provide a theoretical reference for the application of the PPP mode in the project of urban rail transit, and reduce the failure of projects due to inaccurate or unreasonable investment evaluation.

关 键 词：交通运输经济 投资策略 PPP模式 轨道交通项目 社会投资机构 政府 

分 类 号：F224.11[经济管理—国民经济]