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机构地区:[1]安徽工业大学安徽工业大学,安徽马鞍山243002 [2]安徽工业大学商学院,安徽马鞍山243002
出 处:《审计与经济研究》2016年第3期21-30,共10页Journal of Audit & Economics
基 金:国家自然科学基金(71372204、71572002、71272220)
摘 要:以我国2008—2013年沪深A股非金融类上市公司为研究样本,考察了外部盈利压力对企业并购行为的影响,并从内部控制和高管权力双重视角进一步检验其对外部盈利压力与企业并购行为两者关系的调节作用。研究发现:外部盈利压力越大,企业越不倾向于并购,但是这种外部盈利压力对企业并购行为的负面影响会随着内部控制质量的提高而降低;相对内部控制差的企业而言,在内部控制好的企业中,外部盈利压力越大,企业并购的可能性越大,而且这种关系在高管权力小的上市公司更加显著。研究表明,在我国新兴加转轨的关键时期,厘清外部盈利压力与企业并购行为之间的关系及影响这种关系强弱的治理机制具有重要的理论价值与现实意义。By analyzing the data of the non-financial A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from2008 to 2013,this study examines the effect of pressure felt by management to meet or beat analysts' earnings forecasts on firms' M&A behavior.Further,we explore the relationship between earnings pressure and firms' M&A behavior based on internal control and managerial power views.We find that firms under such earnings pressure do not tend to accept M&A,but internal control weakens the negative relationship between earnings pressure and M&A,compared with firms with lower quality of the internal control,firms with higher quality of the internal control under such earnings pressure are more likely to accept M&A.Specifically,this phenomenon will become more apparent when managerial power is dispersed inside a firm.This result indicates that during the transitional period,it has an important theoretical value and practical significance to clarify the relationship between earnings pressure and firms' M&A behavior and the governance mechanism of this relationship.
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