基于委托—代理困境的专利审查数量与质量管理研究  

Study on Patent Examination Quantity and Quality Management Based on Principal-agent Dilemma

作　　者：周璐[1] 朱雪忠[2] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学知识产权研究院,厦门361005 [2]同济大学法学院/知识产权学院,上海200092

出　　处：《研究与发展管理》2016年第2期115-121,共7页R&D Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目"专利审查高速路对后续专利审查质量的影响机制研究"(71273189)

摘　　要：本文基于委托—代理理论从专利审查单位内部的视角研究了解决专利申请积压与授权专利质量下降问题的途径.在承认专利审查员经济理性的前提下,通过分析专利审查员与审查单位之间是否存在目标异质性与信息不对称问题来判断审查单位内部是否存在委托—代理问题.在此基础上,本文从理论模型层面探讨了该委托—代理问题的解决方式,并对我国现行专利审查质量管理体制的改进提出了建议.Based on the principal-agent theory,it studied the way to solve the backlog of patent applications and the decline in granted patents quality from the perspective of the patent office. To determine whether there is principal-agent problem in the patent office,it analyzed the objective heterogeneity and the information asymmetry between patents examiner and the patent office. On this basis,it discussed the way to settle the principal-agent problem through a theoretical model,and finally offered some proposals in regard to improve current quality management system of patent examination.

关 键 词：专利审查 委托—代理 激励 

分 类 号：G306.3[文化科学]