基于博弈论的微型金融使命漂移问题分析  

Analysis of Microfinance Mission Drift based on Game Theory

作　　者：李爱华[1] 张凤[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东建筑大学管理工程学院,山东济南250101

出　　处：《区域金融研究》2016年第2期4-9,共6页Journal of Regional Financial Research

摘　　要：微型金融作为一种有效的扶贫和金融发展手段,已被发展中国家广泛采用。但随后出现的使命漂移现象改变了微型金融的扶贫初衷,不利于全球减贫目标的实现。文章通过构建混合策略的博弈模型,分析使命漂移问题上政府与微型金融机构的行为及其影响因素,研究表明:增加基础设施和公共服务投入、提高税收优惠、增强微型金融机构的收益预期、降低微型金融机构的风险偏好、提高税率、降低使命漂移后的获利空间等能有效减少微型金融使命漂移。Microfinance has been widely used in developing countries as an effective measure to fight against pov-erty and develop financial market. But the mission drift has changed the original intention of microfinance — aim forpoverty alleviation. The goal for fighting against poverty in the world has been badly affected. This research analyzesthe government and financial institution＇s action and influence on mission drift by building up a mixed strategies gametheory model. The research indicates that the increase of infrastructure and public facilities, reducing tax, enhancingprofit anticipate for small financial institutions, lower risk preference would efficiently reduce microfinance missiondrift. Also this research gives advice for how to prevent and correct microfinance mission drift.

关 键 词：微型金融 博弈论 使命漂移 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]