两层分销链中的联盟定价策略与稳定性研究  

Study on the alliance pricing strategy and stability of a two-echelon distribution supply chain

作　　者：李昌文[1,2] 周永务[1] 

机构地区：[1]华南理工大学工商管理学院,广东广州510641 [2]淮北师范大学数学科学学院,安徽淮北235000

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2016年第2期234-241,共8页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71131003;7137075;71402171;71201044;11501233;71501077);教育部人文社科基金资助项目(13YJC630075;15YJC630053);广东省自然科学基金资助项目(2014A030310212;2014A030310443);安徽省高等学校自然科学研究重点资助项目(KJ2015A335;1508085SMA204)

摘　　要：针对1个供应商和2个竞争零售商组成的分销供应链,研究了不同竞争强度下的联盟定价策略和稳定性.首先基于Stackelberg博弈模型给出了不同联盟结构下的定价策略;然后利用合作博弈理论中的Shapley值分配了联盟利润并探讨了大联盟的短视稳定性;最后运用最大一致集理论探讨了各种联盟结构的远视稳定性.结果表明,只有当竞争强度比较弱时,基于Shapley值分配利润的大联盟是短视稳定的;从远视的角度,供应链系统更可能出现的联盟结构为供应商一零售商联盟;当竞争激烈时,2个零售商的联盟也是远视稳定的.For a two-echelon distribution supply chain composed of a single supplier and two competing retailers,the alliance＇s pricing strategy and stability are studied under different competitive intensities.Firstly,this paper analyzes the different alliance pricing strategies based on Stackelberg games;then it allocates the alliance profits based on Shapley value and considers the myopic stability of the grand coalition;finally,it discusses the farsighted stability of all the coalition structures.The result shows that the grand coalition is myopically stable only when the competitive intensity is relatively weak,and that the supplier-retailer alliance is more likely to happen in the long run.With intense competition,the two-retailer alliance is also farsighted stability.

关 键 词：供应链 合作博弈 SHAPLEY值 稳定性 短视参与人 远视参与人 

分 类 号：F224.3[经济管理—国民经济]