零售商主导下物流外包的三级供应链决策  

Decisions for a three-echelon supply chain with logistics outsourcing under a dominant retailer

作　　者：陈晓旭[1,2] 王勇[1,2] 孙海雷[1,2] 陈章跃[1,2] 王义利[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044 [2]重庆大学现代物流重庆市重点实验室,重庆400044

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2016年第2期254-267,共14页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70872123;71272085);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金资助项目(12YJA630135);重庆大学物流开放实验室资助项目(CQKLL12002)

摘　　要：在零售商的订购量对批发价格和服务价格同时具有敏感性的条件下,建立一个零售商主导下包含物流外包的供应链模型.运用博弈理论得出了参与各方的最优决策,并分析了两种敏感性系数,需求波动及物流费用分摊比例对供应链各方最优决策的影响.结果表明,零售商通过控制两种敏感性系数可以抑制制造商和第3方物流商提高价格,增加自身利润;随着市场的变化,各方决策及利润同时增加或减少;承担物流费用比例越高的一方获得的利润也越高.When the retailer＇s order quantity is sensitive to the manufacture＇s wholesale price and the 3PL＇s service price simultaneously,a supply chain model dominated by retailer with logistics outsourcing is built.The optimal prices and order quantity are acquired by using game theory.Furthermore,the impact of the two sensitivity coefficients,the demand range and the allocation ratio of logistics cost on the decision variables are analyzed.Results show that the retailer can inhibit the manufacturer and 3PL to raise their prices and increase his profit,by controlling the two sensitivity coefficients.As the demand changes,all supply chain members＇ decisions and profits increase or decrease simultaneously.Moreover,the one who bears the ratio of the logistics fee more gets more profit.

关 键 词：零售商主导 第3方物流服务提供商 供应链 博弈均衡 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]