公开招标人偏好的政府工程多属性招投标博弈分析  

Research on Multi-attribute Bidding Game of Government Projects When Tenderee's Preference Is Public

作　　者：何建洪[1] 黄莹[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆邮电大学,重庆400065

出　　处：《系统工程》2016年第2期95-102,共8页Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71071101);重庆市科委决策咨询项目(2013jccx A0192);重庆邮电大学博士启动基金资助项目(K2014-02)

摘　　要：将供应链多属性逆向拍卖方法引入研究政府工程多属性招投标,构建了公开招标人偏好的政府工程多属性招投标非合作博弈模型,基于该模型分析了招、投标双方的竞价策略,通过算例仿真发现:在公开招标人偏好系数的政府工程多属性招投标博弈中存在着子博弈精炼纳什均衡;招标人的投标承诺质量和提前工期偏好系数越大,投标人的收益越高,投标人投标的积极性越高,招标人的剩余也越大;投标人收益分别与投标质量和工期呈U形关系,投标人施工质量和工期成本系数值越大,招标人剩余越小。这些结论有助于完善政府工程招投标制度,规范政府工程招投标行为。This paper introduces the method of multi-attribute reverse auction of supply-chain to study multi-attribute bidding for government projects. Firstly, building a non-cooperative multi-attribute bidding game model about government projects in which tenderee＇s preference is public, and then analyzing the tenderee and tender bidding strategies based on the model. According to a numerical example this paper find that： （1） there is a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium in the multi-attribute bidding game about government projects; （2） for the tenderee, the larger the preference coefficient on commitment quality and schedule is, the tender gains more and has more enthusiasm to participate in the bidding, so the tenderee can get more remaining; （3） for the tender, there is an ＂U＂ shape correlation between its gain and commitment quality and schedule; （4） when its preference coefficient on the cost of quality and schedule, the tenderee＇s remaining will become smaller. These conclusions will help improve the government project bidding system and standardize government project bidding behavior.

关 键 词：招标人偏好 政府工程 多属性 博弈 

分 类 号：F724[经济管理—产业经济]