不完全信息下的反倾销游说竞争分析  

The Analysis of Lobbying Competition for Antidumping Decision under Incomplete Information

作　　者：刘锦芳[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]湖南工业大学财经学院 [2]湖南工业大学财经学院会计系

出　　处：《中央财经大学学报》2016年第5期80-89,共10页Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics

基　　金：湖南省社会科学基金项目"基于信息审计的我国企业反倾销政策机制研究"(项目编号:14WTC46);湖南省教育厅科学研究项目"企业应对反倾销的会计信息响应机制研究(项目编号:14C 0330)";湖南工业大学社会科学项目"信息不对称下我国企业反倾销审计机制研究(项目编号:2014HSX30)"

摘　　要：多元化国内企业间的游说竞争对本国反倾销裁决产生多重影响。裁决当局的自主决策意识,利益群体对于裁决当局期望政策的把握程度,企业间的竞争行为,这些因素组合会导致多种可能的政策博弈均衡。揭示反倾销活动中企业游说竞争行为对裁决的具体作用,以及可能出现的政策博弈均衡,对于理解利益群体的理性抉择,制定合理有效的反倾销政策具有重要的现实意义。笔者以反倾销裁决当局和国内异质性企业的政策偏好为外生变量,设计模型,分析企业间游说竞争行为对裁决的影响,以及可能的均衡结果。研究结果表明:利益群体会根据可能的成本收益决定其游说贡献,当难以判断决策当局的理想策略点时,利益群体会放弃游说,当决策当局的政策偏好能够把握,而且预期裁决与企业的目标政策接近时,企业才有动力开展游说;最终的反倾销政策会偏离裁决当局的理想点,落在企业、政府均能接受的区域;博弈活动可能导致"自由贸易",即没有反倾销保护。The lobbying competition among diversified domestic enterprises will have multiple influences on national antidumping ruling. The factors combination such as the ruling authorities＇ autonomous consciousness in decision making,the interests＇ understanding about ruling authorities＇ expected policy,the competition among enterprises,will lead to multiple policies＇ game equilibrium. It has important practical significance for making reasonable and effective antidumping policy and understanding the rational choice of interests＇ groups through revealing the influence of enterprise＇ s lobbying competition in antidumping decision and the possible equilibrium policy. In this paper,the author takes the antidumping ruling authorities and the policy preference of the domestic heterogeneity enterprise as the exogenous variable,design model,analyzes the influence of the corporate lobbying＇ s competition behavior on the antidumping ruling,as well as the possible equilibrium result. We conclude the interests will decide the lobbying contribution with the possible benefit.When it is hard to judge the ruling authorities＇ expected policy,the interests will give up the lobbying. When the policy preferences of the decision-making authorities are able to be grasped,and the expected decision is close to enterprise＇ s target policy,the enterprise has the power to carry out lobbying. The final antidumping policy will deviate from the ideal point of decision making authority and fall in the area which enterprises and government all can accept. The game will probably lead to ＂free trade＂,it means there will be no antidumping protection.

关 键 词：游说竞争 不对称信息 反倾销游说 捐献 

分 类 号：F741[经济管理—国际贸易]