基于粮食处理中心讨价还价博弈模型的原粮供应链治理模式  

The Grain Supply Chain Management Mode based on Bargaining Game Model of Grain Processing Center

作　　者：冷志杰[1] 谢如鹤[2] 

机构地区：[1]黑龙江八一农垦大学经济管理学院,黑龙江大庆163319 [2]广州大学工商管理学院,广东广州510006

出　　处：《中国流通经济》2016年第5期36-43,共8页China Business and Market

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大招标课题"建设统一开放;竞争有序的农产品市场体系研究"之"大宗农产品(粮食)市场体系研究"(14ZDA031);黑龙江省社会科学基金"粮食供应链利益补偿协调机制优化研究"(12B027)

摘　　要：粮食处理中心是粮食"最初一公里"的关键环节。利用鲁宾斯坦(Rubinstein)讨价还价博弈模型,分析粮农与粮食处理中心就激励契约谈判的过程及均衡契约的影响因素,提出粮食处理中心的原粮供应链治理的优化模式:粮食处理中心向上游集成的事前协商模式,即粮食处理中心通过粮食处理提高粮食品质,从而提高粮食等级,顺价卖给收购企业或者国家储备库,获得一个比市价高的价格。针对上游粮农,采用事前协商的讨价还价模式,商讨未来售粮增值利润的分配;通过明示烘干去杂等成本、销售成本、风险成本等信息协调的方式,减少均衡契约获得的谈判成本。均衡契约既优先考虑了粮农利益,又兼顾了处理中心基本利益和机会主义支付,突出了双方的共同利益。Grain processing center is the key for us to deal with the problem of the ＂first one kilometer＂ of grain logistics. With the help of Rubinstein bargaining game model, the authors put forward an optimized supply chain management model for grain processing center, namely the ex ante negotiation model with the grain processing center to be integrated to the upstream. It means that the grain processing center should improve the quality of grain by grain processing to improve the grade of grain, and sell it to buyer enterprises or national grain storages with contango in prices, and gain the return which is higher than the market prices. For the upstream farmers, with the help of this model, they can negotiate the distribution of future value-added profit and reduce the cost of equilibrium contract by such information-coordinating ways as expressing drying cost, selling cost , risk cost and so on. The equilibrium contract cannot only give priority to the consideration of farmers＇ interests, but also consider the processing center＇s basic interest and opportunistic payment; it also highlights the common interests of both sides.

关 键 词：原粮 粮食处理中心 讨价还价博弈模型 供应链治理模式 

分 类 号：F259.21[经济管理—国民经济]