社会救助政策的“负激励”风险及其防范  

A Study on Optimization and Turning of Social Assistance Policy:Eliminating Risk of“Negative Incentive”

作　　者：兰剑[1] 慈勤英[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学社会学系,武汉430072

出　　处：《西北农林科技大学学报（社会科学版）》2016年第3期155-160,共6页Journal of Northwest A&F University(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：教育部哲学社会科学重大攻关项目(13JZD020);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(2014117010201)

摘　　要：通过梳理现行中央和地方政府的社会救助政策,归纳现有政策中存在的"负激励"风险,主要包括:救助资格认定方式单一,救助权责界定模糊,就业扶持与激励力度不足,专项救助瞄准偏差与救助待遇简单叠加。这导致相当一部分适龄劳力的受助者缺乏主动摆脱贫困、积极再就业的意愿。防范社会救助政策的"负激励"风险,关键在于努力实现从给钱给物型的被动型、生存型救助保障,转向注重能力建设、提升自我发展的综合型社会救助。应该建立"支出型贫困"救助,明确实行分类救助,准确定位各救助项目功能,实现救助权责统一,加大就业援助与政策激励,激发受助者再就业主动性,强化"能力援助",提升自我脱贫能力等。This study analyzes the central and local governments＇ current social assistance policy and summarizes the＂negative incentives＂defects in the existing policy.The main ideas include：the qualification of the salvage is single,and the definition of the responsibility of the relief is vague,the employment support and the incentive is insufficient,the special rescue is not precisely aiming and simply superimposed on the relief treatment.These lead to a considerable part of the people with working ability lacking initiative to get rid of poverty and intention of employment.To solve the＂negative incentives＂risk of the social assistance policy,the key is to strive to achieve the turn from the type of passive living relief of giving money and substance to comprehensive social assistance like capacity building and improving self development.The measures of optimizing the policy are suggested as follows：establishing＂expenditure based poverty＂relief,clearly implementing classification aid,accurately positioning the project assistance function,achieving a unified assistance responsibilities,increasing employment assistance and policy incentives,stimulating recipients＇ initiative of reemployment,strengthening capacity assistance,and enhancing the ability of self out of poverty.

关 键 词：社会救助 “负激励"风险 政策转型 低保 

分 类 号：C913[经济管理]