欧债危机:一个博弈分析框架  

European Debt Crisis: An Analytical Framework of Game Theory

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作  者:张弛[1] 

机构地区:[1]福建师范大学经济学院,福建福州350117

出  处:《福建商业高等专科学校学报》2016年第2期1-8,共8页Journal of Fujian Commercial College

摘  要:欧债危机是欧洲诸国由利益驱使后产生的博弈结果。建立多种博弈模型对欧债危机分析并求解,各博弈模型相应的均衡解表明:欧债危机的起因、扩散及解决方案均可由欧元区各国多方博弈的结果进行解释。欧元区各成员国在加入欧元区前应该更好地权衡利弊得失,而我国既要释放支持欧元区的友好信号来共同抗衡美国的金融霸主地位,又要低价收购欧元区实物资产来降低持有美元债券的风险。European debt crisis is a game result, which is driven by interests of European countries. A variety of game models is built to analyze European debt crisis. The corresponding equilibrium solution of the models shows that cause, expansion and solution of the European debt crisis could be explained by the game of member states in euro zone. It is suggested that the member states should weigh the advantages and disadvantages before joining euro zone. China should give support to euro zone to jointly counter the dominance of the United States, as well as buy cheap assets from euro zone to reduce the risk of holding dollar bonds.

关 键 词:欧债危机 欧元区 博弈分析 

分 类 号:F831.59[经济管理—金融学]

 

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