基于Agent的演化博弈下的合作行为研究  

Cooperation under Agent-based Evolutionary Games

作　　者：王健[1] 赵凯[1] 

机构地区：[1]华侨大学,厦门361000

出　　处：《工业技术经济》2016年第5期10-15,共6页Journal of Industrial Technological Economics

基　　金：中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目.华侨大学哲学社会科学青年学者成长工程"‘承诺’的可信性和宏观经济政策的动态不一致--一个博弈论的视角"(项目编号:12SKGC-QG17)

摘　　要：文章在演化博弈的视角下,利用重复囚徒困境博弈(IPD)对合作的演化进行分析。在平均场假设下,合作策略无法在竞争中生存。而在基于Agent的演化博弈中,合作策略有可能获得成功。其原因在于通过限制合作行为的范围,可以使合作者聚集成簇状,从而防止合作的红利被背叛者占有。通过理论推导与计算机仿真,文章证明了利他策略获得成功的条件是c/b/1/m,并对此结果做出了解释。This article used IPD to analyze the evolution of eeoperafive behavior in the field of evolutionary game theory. Under the mean-field assumption, cooperator cannot survive in competition with defectors. However, in agent- based evolutionary game theory, cooperators can thrive. The reason for that is by restricting the scope of cooperation, cooperators can survive by living in clusters, thereby preventing the benefit of cooperation from being exploited by defectors. This article not only compares the difference between spatial evolu- tionary theory and classical theory, but also analyzes the conditions needed for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation using PD game simulation on a regular network.

关 键 词：合作 演化博弈 IPD AGENT 种群博弈模型 

分 类 号：F244.32[经济管理—劳动经济] F270[经济管理—国民经济]