我国工业用地更新的利益还原机制及其绩效分析  

The Land Value Capture Mechanisms and their Performance in Chinese Industrial Land Regeneration

作　　者：胡映洁[1] 吕斌[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京大学城市与环境学院,北京100871

出　　处：《城市发展研究》2016年第4期61-66,92,共7页Urban Development Studies

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目<推进城镇化的重点难点问题研究>(批准号:14ZDA026))

摘　　要：存量工业用地更新是现阶段我国沿海发达城市提升土地利用效率、促进产业转型发展的重要途径。现行制度下为了将大量土地自然增值还原给社会,工业用地规划的调整必须通过政府土地收储再重新招拍挂的方式进行,但该机制存在较大交易成本,在实施中遇到阻碍。各地新出台的工业用地更新政策都在寻找一种替代性的机制,在实现城市规划利益还原的同时尽可能降低交易成本。通过分析各地政策,识别工业用地更新过程中利益还原的具体机制,发现利益捕获与利益限制两类主要机制。接着,以上海和深圳的工业用地更新政策为例,对比不同利益还原模式的机制特征及其实施绩效。The regeneration of industrial land is one of the most important methods to improve the land efficiency and upgrade the industry in Chinese coastal cities. However, the institution of land banking and bid, auction and listing system, as the only option to capture increment land value in industrial land regeneration, generated huge transaction costs and impeded the whole regeneration process. Local governments made new policies to solve this problem, searching for alternatives to keep the market vibrate while capturing the increment. By researching on the industrial land regeneration policies in different Chinese cities, the paper identified two main alternative value capture mechanisms and evaluate their impacts on transaction costs and the amount of value captured. Then the paper applied this framework to compare the policies of Shanghai and Shenzhen and evaluate their performance.

关 键 词：工业用地更新 利益还原 交易成本 案例对比 

分 类 号：K901[历史地理—人文地理学]