需求依赖价格下具有不公平厌恶的供应链协调  

Supply Chain Coordination with Inequity Aversion Under Price-dependent Demand

作　　者：刘玉霜[1] 闫鹏飞[1] 

机构地区：[1]青岛科技大学数理学院,山东青岛266061

出　　处：《青岛科技大学学报（自然科学版）》2016年第2期220-226,共7页Journal of Qingdao University of Science and Technology:Natural Science Edition

基　　金：青岛市应用基础研究计划项目(青年专项14-02-4-56-jch)

摘　　要：针对随机需求依赖零售价格,探讨零售商的不公平厌恶行为倾向对供应链契约协调的影响。区分零售商具有不利不公平厌恶和有利不公平厌恶两种情形,建立数学模型,分析批发价契约能否实现供应链的零售价格和订购量的同时协调。研究结果表明,当零售商具有不利不公平厌恶行为时,批发价契约不能协调零售商的价格决策;当零售商具有有利不公平厌恶行为时,批发价契约能够改善渠道绩效和实现供应链协调。然后给出两种情形下,零售商的最优定价-订购联合决策的解析表达式,并用算例验证了结论的正确性。最后,在随机需求依赖价格下,证明收益共享契约依然能够协调具有不公平厌恶的供应链,并且协调条件不会改变,与零售商的不公平厌恶行为倾向无关。Considering a supply chain facing stochastic price-dependent demand,this paper discusses how the retailer′s inequity aversion influences the coordination of supply chain.Based on the disadvantageous inequity and advantageous inequality,a mathematical model is formulated to investigate whether the wholesale price contract that coordinate the retailer′s pricing also coordinate the retailer′s order quantity.The results show that the wholesale price contract fail to coordinate the price decision,while it can improve the channel efficiency and coordinate the supply chain in advantageous inequity aversion case.Further,we give the existence and uniqueness of the pricing-ordering joint decision and two numerical examples are used to verify the findings.In the last part of this paper,it is proved that the revenue sharing contract is still able to coordinate the inequity-averse retailer′s price and quantity decisions,and the conditions of coordination will not change.

关 键 词：需求依赖价格 不公平厌恶 批发价契约 定价-订购联合决策 协调 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]