基于供应商联盟的混合补货方式下ATO供应链补货策略  

Replenishment Policy of ATO Supply Chain under Mixed Replenishment Mode Based on Supplier Alliance

作　　者：李宇雨[1] 黄波[2] 

机构地区：[1]重庆师范大学计算机与信息科学学院,重庆400047 [2]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2016年第2期124-132,共9页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71102178);中国教育部人文社科资助项目(11YJC630070)

摘　　要：考虑ATO供应链中组装商通过拉动式和推动式两种补货方式分别从两个供应商处采购零部件,供应商可以结成联盟与其进行谈判,构建了相应的ATO供应链Stackberg非合作博弈和讨价还价合作博弈模型,研究了ATO供应链零部件生产及补货策略,收益分配策略和供应商结盟策略,并比较了两种决策模式下的供应链最优策略,分析了各方议价能力等对最优策略的影响。研究发现,ATO供应链通过合作博弈制定的策略实现了非合作博弈的Pareto改进;组装商的谈判顺序决策权能为其在谈判中带来额外收益,供应商通过结盟参与谈判则可对此有效化解,并在供应商议价能力均较强的情况下,提高所有供应商的利润。Under the ATO（assemble-to-order） mode, a manufacturer assembles final products only after receiving orders from a customer. Therefore, it is critical for ATO supply chains to run successfully by having components supplied in time.This paper made an assumption that an ATO supply chain consists of two component suppliers, which are Supplier 1 and Supplier 2, and one ATO manufacturer, who replenishes component 1 from Supplier 1 by using push replenishment mode, and component 2 from Supplier 2 by pull replenishment mode. Suppliers can form an alliance to negotiate with an ATO manufacturer. We propose a Stackelberg game model and a replenishment bargaining model of ATO supply chains under the mixed replenishment mode. Supplier alliance is proposed to study component production and replenishment policy, profit-sharing policy and suppliers＇ alliance policy. In the Stackelberg game, ATO manufacturers and component suppliers decide no replenishment quantities and prices of Component 1 and Component 2 in order to maximize their own profit. There are three stages of decision-making in the Stackelberg game. In the first stage, Supplier 1 decides the price of Component 1. In the second stage, ATO manufacturer decides the replenishment quantity of Component 1 and the price of Component 2 according to the price of Component 1, assembly cost of unit product and market demand of products. In the third stage, Supplier 2 decides the quantity of Component 2 according to the replenishment price offered by the ATO manufacturer. In the bargaining game, ATO manufacturer and component suppliers decide on replenishment quantity and prices of Component 1 and Component 2 in order to maximize the total profit of ATO supply chains. There are three stages of decision-making in the bargaining game for ATO supply chains. In the first stage, suppliers decide whether to form a supplier alliance. In the second stage, ATO manufacturer and component suppliers decide replenishment quantities and bargaining sequence under the condition that suppl

关 键 词：ATO供应链 供应商联盟 Stackberg博弈 讨价还价博弈 补货策略 

分 类 号：F406.2[经济管理—产业经济]