区域性物流园区竞合策略的演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Competition and Cooperation Strategy among Regional Logistics Parks

作　　者：欧江涛[1] 马祖军[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院物流与应急管理研究所,四川成都610031

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2016年第2期98-103,共6页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划资助项目(NCET-10-0706);四川省软科学研究计划项目(2014ZR0048);四川省学术和技术带头人培养资金资助项目(川财社[2012]319号);成都社会科学学术年会重大招标课题(SKNHR13-05)

摘　　要：针对我国物流园区发展现状,探讨了区域性物流园区之间的竞合策略。建立了区域性物流园区竞合策略的演化博弈模型,据此分析了物流园区间竞争合作关系演变发展的趋势。研究表明,区域性物流园区之间长期竞争合作演化的结果是完全竞争或完全合作;在一定条件下,物流园区竞合策略选择的动态演化过程收敛于哪一个均衡点受到博弈发生的初始状态的影响,演化的路径和最终状态与转化能力、风险水平以及资源水平密切相关。There are many problems in the development of logistics parks in China, such as redundant construc- tion, too large scales, too high vacancy rates, and a large amount of resources waste. One of the effective meas- ures is to integrate logistic park resources. Therefore, the competition and cooperation strategy among regional logistics parks is explored in this paper. An evolutionary game model for competition and cooperation strategy among logistics parks is developed to analyze the long-term evolutionary development trend of competition and co- operation relationship among logistics parks, and the parameters such as the transformation ability, the level of risk and resources among logistics parks are analyzed. The results show that the consequence of probable equilib- rium resulting from long-term competition and cooperation among logistics parks is either complete competition or complete cooperation. In certain circumstances, the evolutionary direction is closely related to players＇ payoff, and influenced by the initial status. And the path and the final state are closely related to the transformation ability, the level of risk and resources among logistics parks.

关 键 词：物流园区 竞争合作 演化博弈 资源共享 

分 类 号：F25[经济管理—国民经济]