高管联结影响企业内部控制质量吗?——来自中国上市公司的经验证据  

Can Executives' Ties Affect the Quality of Internal Control?——Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Enterprises

作　　者：张萍[1] 徐巍[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学商学院,江苏南京210093

出　　处：《商业经济与管理》2016年第4期79-89,共11页Journal of Business Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目"企业社会责任信息及其作用机理研究"(71402068)

摘　　要：从组织间社会关系网络视角出发,文章以2006年-2013年我国上市公司为样本,考察了高管联结对内部控制体系构建的影响。研究发现:存在高管联结关系的公司间,内部控制质量具有显著的相似性,联结关系越紧密,相似度更高;处于同一行业、同规模等级的联结公司间,其内部控制质量的相似度更高;进一步地,将高管联结按照其专业背景划分为财务专家型联结与非财务专家型联结后,发现财务专家型联结能够显著地促进内部控制质量相似度。This paper empirically study the effects of executives ＇ ties on the internal control, from the perspective of inter-corporate networks . Using data of listed companies in China stock market from 2006 to 2013, we finds that： interlocked firms are shared similar internal control behaviors, that is, the higher the internal control quality of tied corporate ,the better internal control quality of focal corporate; Further study found that the similarity is higher when the shared executives has accounting-relevant position or experience. The evidence indicates that the social network of executives plays an important role in the quality of firms＇ internal control, this offers the practical implications for those whom want to improve their internal control quality.

关 键 词：高管联结 内部控制 财务专家型联结 

分 类 号：F234.4[经济管理—会计学]