考虑风险企业家有公平偏好的风险投资激励机制——基于显性努力和隐性努力的视角  

Incentive mechanism for venture investment when venture entrepreneurs have fairness preferences-from explicit efforts and implicit efforts perspectives

作　　者：丁川[1] 陈璐[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学金融数学研究所,成都610074

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2016年第4期104-117,共14页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：教育部人文社科研究规划基金资助项目(14XJCZH001);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(JBK160205;JBK151116)

摘　　要：将风险企业家的努力分为显性努力和隐性努力,基于不同努力类型建立了完全理性下的风险投资委托代理模型,在此基础上,将行为经济学的公平偏好植入到风险投资激励模型中,并针对不同情况进行建模分析,研究结果表明:如果风险企业家具有显性努力时,公平偏好系数对激励系数、风险企业家的努力水平和风险投资家的努力水平都没有影响;如果风险企业家的努力是隐性努力,风险投资家需要给予风险企业家下项目收益分享(激励系数大于0),并且如果风险企业家具有公平偏好心理,那么风险投资家支付的项目收益分享比例要大于完全理性下的项目收益分享比例,风险企业家和风险投资家都会降低努力水平,但风险企业家获得的实际利润是最多的.同时,风险企业家的公平偏好嫉妒系数越大,获得的实际利润也越大,但风险投资家的实际利润与公平偏好嫉妒系数负相关.最后,利用仿真模拟对理论结果进一步分析和检验.In this paper,the entrepreneur efforts are divided into explicit efforts and implicit efforts. According to the different types of efforts,a principal-agent model with rational venture investment is established.The fairness preference of behavioral economics is embedded into the venture investment’s incentive model,which is studied in different situations. Results showed that： If the venture entrepreneur has explicit efforts,the fairness preference coefficient will have no influence on the incentive coefficient,the venture entrepreneur’s effort level and venture capitalist’s effort level. If the venture entrepreneur’s efforts are implicit,the venture capitalists should share the project income with the venture entrepreneur（ the venture entrepreneur’s incentive coefficient is greater than 0）. Moreover,if the venture entrepreneur has fairness preferences,the project’s revenue sharing coefficient is greater than the project profit’s sharing coefficient; the venture entrepreneur and venture capitalists will both reduce the effort level; however,the venture entrepreneur’s actual profits are the highest. At the same time,the larger the venture entrepreneur’s fairness preference jealousy coefficient is,the more the actual profits are obtained. But the actual profit of the venture capitalists is negatively related to the fairness preference jealousy coefficient. Finally,with a simulation,the results of theoretical solution are further tested and analyzed,and the same conclusions are reached.

关 键 词：显性努力 隐性努力 公平偏好 委托代理 

分 类 号：F019[经济管理—政治经济学] C93[经济管理—管理学]