一种在不可信操作系统内核中高效保护应用程序的方法  

Method to Efficiently Protect Applications from Untrusted OS Kernel

作　　者：邓良[1,2] 曾庆凯[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]计算机软件新技术国家重点实验室(南京大学),江苏南京210023 [2]南京大学计算机科学与技术系,江苏南京210023

出　　处：《软件学报》2016年第5期1309-1324,共16页Journal of Software

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(61170070,61572248,61431008,61321491);国家科技支撑计划(2012BAK26B01);南京大学优秀博士研究生创新能力提升计划B(2015)~~

摘　　要：在现代操作系统中,内核运行在最高特权层,管理底层硬件并向上层应用程序提供系统服务,因而安全敏感的应用程序很容易受到来自底层不可信内核的攻击.提出了一种在不可信操作系统内核中保护应用程序的方法App Fort.针对现有方法的高开销问题,App Fort结合x86硬件机制(操作数地址长度)、内核代码完整性保护和内核控制流完整性保护,对不可信内核的硬件操作和软件行为进行截获和验证,从而高效地保证应用程序的内存、控制流和文件I/O安全.实验结果表明:App Fort的开销极小,与现有工作相比明显提高了性能.In commodity OS, the OS kernel runs in the highest privilege layer to manage hardware resources and provides system services. Thus, security-sensitive applications are vulnerable to compromises the underlying untrusted kernel. In this paper, an approach named App Fort is proposed to protect applications from an untrusted OS kernel. To address the high overheads of existing solutions, App Fort makes use of the unique combination of an x86 hardware feature（operand address size）, kernel code integrity protection and kernel control flow integrity protection, to intercept and verify both hardware and software operations of the untrusted kernel. As a result, App Fort efficiently protects application＇s memory, control flows and file I/O, even if the kernel is fully compromised. Experimental results demonstrate that App Fort only incurs very small overhead, which is much better than previous work.

关 键 词：不可信操作系统内核 应用程序保护 操作数地址长度 

分 类 号：TP316[自动化与计算机技术—计算机软件与理论]