新型城镇化视角下地方政府竞争对企业创新投资影响研究  

Research on the Effect of Local Government Competition on Innovation Investment from the Perspective of New-style Urbanization

作　　者：王栋[1] 汪波[1] 李晓燕[2] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理与经济学部,天津300072 [2]天津财经大学珠江学院,天津300222

出　　处：《软科学》2016年第5期35-39,共5页Soft Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71203157)

摘　　要：建立吸引外企创新投资的双寡头政府竞争模型,阐述地方政府竞争对企业创新投资的作用机制,运用二元选择和门限的面板数据模型进行实证检验。研究结果表明:1地方政府竞争对创新投资的作用主要通过优惠政策、基础设施建设和资源禀赋进行;2二者呈现"□"型的关系;3地方政府的效率、区域资本的存量、城市化率对地方政府吸引外界企业创新投资有直接的影响作用;4地方政府需运用成本收益的分析方法通过对比政府的优惠政策和企业创新投资所带来的收益,计算出所能付出的最大优惠政策。This paper establishes duopoly competition model of attracting foreign innovative investment elaborates the action mechanism and does empirical test with binary choice and threshold models. Results show that, firstly, the effect of horizon- tal competition on innovative investment carries out mainly through incentives, infrastructure and natural resources. Second- ly, there was the ＂□＂ relationship between local government competition and innovation investment. Thirdly, the efficiency of government, regional capital stock and urbanization rate have a direct influence on attracting foreign innovation invest- ment. In the end, local governments need to calculate the maximum incentives can be paid through comparing the earnings brought by government incentives and innovation investment by cost-benefit analysis.

关 键 词：新型城镇化 地方政府竞争 企业创新投资 二元选择 

分 类 号：F127[经济管理—世界经济] F273.2