个体受贿行为倾向与反腐策略  

Individual Behavior of Corruption and Anti-Corruption Strategies

作　　者：杨金桥[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学马克思主义学院,辽宁大连116025

出　　处：《东北财经大学学报》2016年第3期12-18,共7页Journal of Dongbei University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：辽宁省社会科学规划基金项目"心理学视阈下的大学生人生观教育实践研究"(L14BSZ043)

摘　　要：目前关于腐败问题的研究多集中在政治学和法学领域,并偏重于对腐败行为的社会原因、政治原因等宏观层面的理论分析,但普遍缺乏在微观层面对个体受贿行为决策的影响因素及一般规律的实证性探索。本文在行为决策学的视阈下,对个体受贿行为的选择倾向进行了研究,结果发现:当损失时间和损失概率都不确定时,被试会更倾向于选择受贿;当损失时间确定但损失概率不确定时,被试可能遭受的损失程度越大,其受贿倾向越弱;当损失概率确定但损失时间不确定时,被试可能遭受的损失程度越大,其受贿倾向越弱。Currently, the researches on corruption are mostly concerned by the political scientists and jurists, they are interested in the social and political causes of corruption, and get used to do the theoretical analysis at the macro level, but there are less researches focus on the individual decision mechanism when faced to the bribe-taking situation at the micro level. This study explored the individual＇s bribe-taking decision tendency on the behavioral decision perspective, the results shows：when the loss time and loss probability were both uncertain ,the subjects were more likely to take the bribe; when the loss time was certain, the loss probability was uncertain, and the loss that subjects might have suffered increased, their tendency of taking the bribe became weaker; when the loss probability was certain, the loss time was uncertain, and the loss that subjects might have suffered increased, their tendency of taking the bribe became weaker.

关 键 词：个体受贿 行为决策学 腐败行为 反腐策略 

分 类 号：F069.9[经济管理—政治经济学]