基础创新与最优专利侵权补偿机制  

Basic innovation and optimal compensation mechanism of patent infringement

作　　者：董亮[1] 任剑新[2] 于飞[1] 

机构地区：[1]桂林电子科技大学商学院,广西桂林541004 [2]中南财经政法大学工商管理学院,湖北武汉430073

出　　处：《科研管理》2016年第5期78-86,共9页Science Research Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(15BJY002)

摘　　要：通过一个三方博弈模型,分析了产品差异化条件下利润损失规则和不当所得规则对基础研究型累积创新的保护作用,并在此基础上进行了最优专利侵权补偿机制的设计。结果表明,与不当所得规则相比,利润损失规则能够更好地保障专利持有者的利益。法院只有通过混合利用不同侵权补偿规制建立事前机制,对厂商行为进行间接引导,才能使社会福利达到最优。法院不应只是一个"仲裁者",也应是一个"引导者",在专利制度中发挥更加主动的作用。Through a trilateral game model,this paper studies the protective effect of lost- royalty doctrine and unjust- enrichment doctrine on cumulative innovation of basic research respectively under the condition of product differentiation,and then analyses the optimal compensation mechanism of patent infringement on this basis. The results show that lost- royalty doctrine could effectively maintain the benefits of patent holders compared with unjust- enrichment doctrine. Only through mixed usage of the two compensation mechanism can an ex- ante mechanism be built,and the court could maximize social welfare by guiding firms＇ behavior indirectly. The court is not only an＂arbiter＂but also a＂guide＂,and plays a more proactive role in the patent system.

关 键 词：基础创新 专利侵权 利润损失规则 不当所得规则 

分 类 号：G306.3[文化科学]