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机构地区:[1]中南财经政法大学政府会计研究所,430073 [2]西南财经大学会计学院,611130 [3]对外经济贸易大学国际商学院,100029
出 处:《经济研究》2016年第5期72-85,共14页Economic Research Journal
基 金:国家自然科学基金面上项目(71172222和71572194);国家自然科学基金海外及港澳学者合作研究基金项目(71428008)的资助
摘 要:政府官员的信息垄断能力,有助于其实现自由裁量预算最大化目标。预算公开能够缓解政府与公众之间的信息不对称,提升公众监督政府预算的能力。媒体的信息中介功能与声誉治理功能将在预算公开中发挥预算干预作用,进一步提升政府预算公开的效果。本文选择中央部门预决算公开中的媒体报道作为研究对象,将"三公"预算视为官员自由裁量预算的替代变量,考察媒体报道对中央部门"三公"预算编制的影响。我们发现:(1)政府"三公"预算编制行为存在着预算执行比率越高,预算增长程度越大的现象,而媒体关注能够显著抑制二者间的正相关关系;(2)不同报道情绪对"三公"预算的治理作用存在差异:正面报道能够直接激励官员抑制本期"三公"预算执行比率对下期预算增长率的正向影响;而负面报道只有在行政治理机制介入时,才能发挥预算抑制作用。本文从预算公开视角拓展了媒体治理研究,并发现在中国独有的制度背景下,媒体能够依托行政体系内部的激励约束机制发挥出有效的政府治理作用。Government is capable of monopolizing information to maximize its budget. The information asymmetry between government and the public can be alleviated by budget disclosure which elevates the ability of the public supervision. The media's information intermediary function and reputation management function play an interferential role in budget disclosure, and further enforce the effects of budget disclosure. This article chooses media coverage of central government budget disclosure as research object, and observes the "three public budget" of Chinese central government as the proxy of budget maximizing behavior to examine the effects of media coverage and mood. We find that (1) Media coverage significantly restrains the positive association between the current budget implementation efficiency and the degree of future budget growth; (2) The effects of media mood on budget behavior arc different: the positive media mood can directly motivate officials to inhibit the positive association between the current budget implementation efficiency and the future budget growth rate, while the negative media mood works relying on the constrain system of government administration. Our study supplies the new empirical evidences of the effects of media on the government behavior and concludes that the media works on the condition of the incentive and constraints system of government administration under the unique China institutional background.
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